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________________ 
 
OPINION 
________________ 
 
BRANN, District Judge.  
 While employed in an administrative position at West 
Chester University of Pennsylvania, Colleen Bradley shared 
her concerns about one of the school’s budget documents with 
her colleagues.  Subsequently, she was informed by her 
supervisor that her employment contract would not be 
renewed.  Arguing that her speech was protected by the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and that her 
termination was in retaliation for that speech, she sued the 
school, the Pennsylvania State System of Higher Education, 
her supervisor, and several other administrators. 
 The United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania dismissed Ms. Bradley’s claim against West 
Chester and the State System, holding that those institutions 
were entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment to 
the United States Constitution.  After discovery, the District 
Court granted summary judgment in favor of Ms. Bradley’s 
supervisor, Mark Mixner, holding that, although Ms. Bradley’s 
speech was constitutionally protected, Mr. Mixner was entitled 
to qualified immunity. 
 We will affirm both of these rulings of the District 
Court.  We agree with the District Court’s holding on Eleventh 
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Amendment immunity, and therefore uphold its dismissal of 
the claims against West Chester and the State System.  We 
disagree with the District Court’s holding on the protected 
status of Ms. Bradley’s speech, but because we hold that the 
speech was not constitutionally protected, we uphold its grant 
of summary judgment in favor of Mr. Mixner. 
I. 
A.1 
 Colleen Bradley was hired as Director of Budget and 
Financial Planning at the West Chester University of 
Pennsylvania (“WCU”) in November 2011.  In that position, 
Ms. Bradley was responsible for, inter alia, reviewing the 
university’s budget creation process and recommending 
improvements to it, as well as attending and participating in 
various administrative meetings.  Ms. Bradley’s immediate 
supervisor at WCU was Mark Mixner, the university’s Vice 
President of Finance and Administration. 
 One of Ms. Bradley’s regular assignments was to assist 
in the preparation of what was known as a “BUD Report.”2  As 
a member institution of the Pennsylvania State System of 
                                                 
1  Because we are reviewing the District Court’s grant of 
summary judgment in favor of Mr. Mixner, the 
following facts are either undisputed or viewed in the 
light most favorable to Ms. Bradley, and we have 
drawn all reasonable inferences from those facts in her 
favor.  Dougherty v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 772 F.3d 979, 
986 (3d Cir. 2014). 
2  App. 469. 
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Higher Education (“PASSHE”),3 WCU regularly submitted a 
budget—or BUD Report—to PASSHE.  PASSHE, in turn, 
would compile its member universities’ BUD Reports and 
submit them to the Commonwealth for appropriation purposes. 
 While creating one of WCU’s annual BUD Reports, 
Ms. Bradley was instructed by PASSHE administrators to 
increase the “Transfer to Plant” line item in the report by 
several million dollars, which would “swing” the report’s 
showing of a multi-million dollar surplus to a showing of a 
multi-million dollar deficit.4  The “swing,” in her view, was 
purposely designed; when she questioned a PASSHE 
administrator about the practice, she was told that the BUD 
Report “was a political document[,] and if you don’t present 
this deficit, your appropriation money is at risk.”5  Ms. Bradley 
also spoke to Mr. Mixner, who agreed with the characterization 
of the BUD Report as a “political document” and urged Ms. 
Bradley to cooperate with the PASSHE administrators’ 
request.6 
 Ms. Bradley regularly attended the weekly meetings of 
WCU’s Administrative Budget Committee (“ABC”).  On 
September 20, 2012, at one of these meetings, Ms. Bradley 
                                                 
3  PASSHE comprises fourteen universities:  
Bloomsburg, California, Cheyney, Clarion, East 
Stroudsburg, Edinboro, Indiana, Kutztown, Lock 
Haven, Mansfield, Millersville, Shippensburg, 
Slippery Rock, and West Chester.  24 P.S. § 20-2002-
A(a). 
4  App. 73, 469-70. 
5  App. 468. 
6  App. 469. 
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discussed the BUD Report, expressing her belief that the 
PASSHE-requested alterations were “unethical and quite 
frankly, [possibly] illegal.”7  She also told the ABC that “I’m 
bringing it to this committee because I feel as though it is my 
responsibility because you are the budget committee, and I just 
need to explain the predicament we’re all in.”8  A few days 
later, Mr. Mixner expressed his displeasure at Ms. Bradley’s 
comments to the ABC, noting that he “could not believe that 
[she] would present such a packet to the budget committee,” 
and that her “credibility as well as [her] future was at risk.”9 
 At the next ABC meeting, on September 27, 2012, Ms. 
Bradley circulated a memorandum documenting her concerns. 
It noted that she “object[ed] to [the] submission” of the BUD 
Report showing a deficit, and “to the entire reporting 
process.”10  It also stated that: 
I am an employee of the State and the University 
and it is my responsibility to report data that I can 
support and explain.  Currently, I cannot explain 
or justify this budgeting technique and the 
implications make me very uncomfortable.  I 
have openly and cooperatively been seeking 
answers to authenticate the data, but have not 
received any response.  In the meantime, it has 
been explained to me that my actions last week 
have endangered my credibility and I find this 
hugely disappointing due to [sic] I am seeking 
                                                 
7  Id. 
8  App. 470. 
9  App. 469. 
10  App. 169. 
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truth and trying to perform my job with integrity 
and honesty.11 
Presumably, however, Ms. Bradley’s actions did not persuade 
anyone at PASSHE or WCU to change the BUD Report 
practice at that time.   
More than two years after the September 2012 ABC 
meetings, Mr. Mixner asked Ms. Bradley to assist in 
preparations for an October 29, 2014 meeting of WCU’s 
Enrollment Management Committee (“EMC”), which was 
being held to prepare for a presentation to a group of WCU’s 
“opinion leaders” the following day.12  Leading up to the 
meeting, Mr. Mixner and Ms. Bradley considered several 
possible budgets for presentation to the EMC.  The night before 
the meeting, however, Mr. Mixner indicated his desire to use a 
version of the budget with “non-discounted scenarios”—i.e., in 
Ms. Bradley’s opinion, a version of the budget that “inflated 
the expenses.”13 
 At the EMC meeting, Ms. Bradley presented Mr. 
Mixner’s preferred budget, which showed a $15 million 
deficit.  An EMC member, who had apparently believed that 
WCU had an $11 million surplus, queried how such a deficit 
was possible, especially in light of increased enrollment at 
WCU.  Ms. Bradley expressed amusement at this question 
(“Well, it’s funny that you say that . . . .”), indicated that Mr. 
                                                 
11  Id. 
12  App. 475. 
13  App. 476, 755.  In Ms. Bradley’s opinion, her preferred 
budget reflected “reality,” while Mr. Mixner’s 
“showed the sky is falling.”  App. 475. 
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Mixner had chosen that specific budget, and proceeded to 
present an alternate budget, which, she believed, “presents 
reality.”14 
 Mr. Mixner was angered by Ms. Bradley’s decision to 
present her budget at the EMC meeting.  Although she was 
expected to speak at the “opinion leaders” presentation the next 
day, Ms. Bradley refused to do so unless she could present her 
version of the budget.  Mr. Mixner refused that request and 
presented his budget instead.  Ms. Bradley did not speak at that 
presentation and “was embarrassed to be there.”15   
 A few weeks later, at an in-person meeting, Mr. Mixner 
told Ms. Bradley that she was “not the cultural fit for the 
university” and that her contract would not be renewed.16  Mr. 
Mixner formalized this decision in a November 18, 2014 letter, 
which stated that he “no longer ha[d] confidence that [she] can 
provide the leadership that the University needs.”17  Ms. 
Bradley’s contract expired on June 30, 2015. 
B. 
 On May 14, 2015, Ms. Bradley initiated the instant 
action by filing a four-count complaint in the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania against Mr. Mixner, WCU, PASSHE, and a 
number of other WCU and PASSHE administrators.  In Count 
I, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, she alleged that her 
termination was unconstitutional retaliation for speech 
protected by the First Amendment.  In Count II, brought under 
                                                 
14  App. 476. 
15  App. 477. 
16  App. 478. 
17  App. 384. 
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the Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law, 43 P.S. §§ 1421-28, she 
likewise alleged that her termination was unlawful retaliation.  
In Counts III and IV, Ms. Bradley alleged that defendants’ 
actions constituted, respectively, intentional and negligent 
infliction of emotional distress.   
 The District Court dismissed Count I of this complaint 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) on 
December 9, 2015, holding that WCU and PASSHE, as well as 
the administrators in their official capacities, were entitled to 
Eleventh Amendment immunity under this Court’s decision in 
Skehan v. State System of Higher Education,18 and that, 
therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction to hear claims against 
those parties.  It granted Ms. Bradley leave to amend her 
complaint, however, to name the administrators in their 
individual capacities.  Ms. Bradley did so in an amended 
complaint filed January 15, 2016. 
 On April 19, 2016, the District Court dismissed Counts 
I, III, and IV of Ms. Bradley’s Amended Complaint as to all 
defendants except Mr. Mixner in his individual capacity.  It 
dismissed Count II without prejudice, in order to allow Ms. 
Bradley to refile that claim in state court. 
 On March 3, 2017, the District Court granted summary 
judgment in favor of Mr. Mixner on Count I.19  Although it 
held that, under this Court’s precedent, Ms. Bradley’s speech 
was protected by the First Amendment, it also held that Mr. 
Mixner was entitled to qualified immunity for terminating Ms. 
Bradley because his conduct did not violate a clearly 
                                                 
18  815 F.2d 244 (3d Cir. 1987). 
19  Ms. Bradley withdrew the claims in Counts III and IV 
on November 21, 2016. 
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established federal right. 
 Ms. Bradley filed a notice of appeal on March 16, 2017.  
In this Court, she challenges the District Court’s December 9, 
2015 order dismissing WCU and PASSHE on the grounds of 
Eleventh Amendment immunity, and the District Court’s 
March 3, 2017 order granting summary judgment in favor of 
Mr. Mixner. 
II. 
A. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 
1331, 1343, and 1367.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291. 
B. 
Summary judgment may be granted when “the movant 
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact 
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”20  A 
dispute is “genuine if a reasonable trier-of-fact could find in 
favor of the non-movant,” and “material if it could affect the 
outcome of the case.”21  To defeat a motion for summary 
judgment, then, the nonmoving party must point to evidence in 
the record that would allow a jury to rule in that party’s favor.22  
                                                 
20  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a). 
21  Lichtenstein v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 691 F.3d 
294, 300 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248, 252 (1986)). 
22  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(1); Liberty 
Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249. 
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When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, a court 
should draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-
moving party.23   
We review a District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment de novo.24  We likewise review the District Court’s 
holding on Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity de 
novo.25 
 
C. 
 We first consider whether the District Court properly 
granted summary judgment in favor of Mr. Mixner on Ms. 
Bradley’s First Amendment retaliation claim.   
Although “public employees do not surrender all their 
First Amendment rights by reason of their employment,”26 the 
United States Supreme Court has noted the need to strike a 
“careful balance ‘between the interests of the [employee], as a 
citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern[,] and 
the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the 
efficiency of the public services it performs through its 
                                                 
23 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 
475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). 
24  Gorum v. Sessoms, 561 F.3d 179, 184 (3d Cir. 2009). 
25  Maliandi v. Montclair State Univ., 845 F.3d 77, 82 (3d 
Cir. 2016). 
26  Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 417 (2006); see 
also Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 383 (1987) 
(“[A] State may not discharge an employee on a basis 
that infringes that employee’s constitutionally 
protected interest in freedom of speech.”). 
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employees.’”27  Thus, when considering a First Amendment 
retaliation claim, we first inquire whether the speech at issue 
is, in fact, constitutionally protected, and then consider whether 
the government had an “‘adequate justification’ for treating the 
employee differently than the general public based on its needs 
as an employer.”28  The District Court held that Ms. Bradley’s 
speech was constitutionally protected, but nevertheless granted 
summary judgment in favor of Mr. Mixner on qualified 
immunity grounds.  We disagree with the District Court’s 
conclusion as to the protected status of Ms. Bradley’s speech, 
but—because we may affirm on any ground supported by the 
record29—uphold its judgment in favor of Mr. Mixner. 
1. 
 Speech by government employees is constitutionally 
protected when the employee is speaking “as a citizen, not as 
an employee,” and when the speech “involve[s] a matter of 
public concern.”30  If these two prerequisites are not met, a 
public employee “has no First Amendment cause of action 
based on his or her employer’s reaction to the speech.”31 
                                                 
27  Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2374 (2014) (first 
alteration in original) (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Ed., 
391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)). 
28  Dougherty v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 772 F.3d 979, 
987 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Gorum, 561 F.3d at 185). 
29  Gorum, 561 F.3d at 184. 
30  Dougherty, 772 F.3d at 987.  Here, the parties do not 
dispute that Ms. Bradley’s speech involved a matter of 
public concern. 
31  Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418. 
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In Garcetti v. Ceballos, the United States Supreme 
Court held that “when public employees make statements 
pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking 
as citizens for First Amendment purposes,” and that, therefore, 
“the Constitution does not insulate their communications from 
employer discipline.”32  In that case, a deputy district attorney 
alleged that he was unconstitutionally retaliated against after 
composing an internal memorandum that discussed perceived 
“serious misrepresentations” in a search warrant affidavit.33  
The Supreme Court noted that the attorney “expressed his 
views inside his office, rather than publicly,” and that the 
“memo concerned the subject matter of [his] employment,” but 
noted that these factors were not dispositive.34  The 
“controlling factor,” instead, was that the memo was written 
“pursuant to [the attorney’s] duties as a calendar deputy”—i.e., 
he wrote it “because that is part of what he, as a calendar 
deputy, was employed to do.”35   
                                                 
32  Id. at 421; see also id. at 421-22 (“Restricting speech 
that owes its existence to a public employee’s 
professional responsibilities does not infringe any 
liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private 
citizen.  It simply reflects the exercise of employer 
control over what the employer itself has 
commissioned or created.”). 
33  Id. at 413-15. 
34  Id. at 420-21. 
35  Id. at 421; see also Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 
2378 (2014) (characterizing the memorandum at issue 
in Garcetti as “prepared . . . in the course of [the 
plaintiff’s] ordinary job responsibilities”). 
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Because the parties in Garcetti did not dispute that the 
attorney’s memo was written pursuant to his official duties, the 
Supreme Court admitted that it “ha[d] no occasion to articulate 
a comprehensive framework for defining the scope of an 
employee’s duties in cases where there is room for serious 
debate,” and noted that “[t]he proper inquiry is a practical 
one.”36  This Court has fleshed out that framework in a series 
of decisions.  In Foraker v. Chaffinch, for example, we held 
that state troopers were speaking pursuant to their official 
duties when they expressed concerns about deficiencies at a 
firing range up their chain of command and with the State 
Auditor, since monitoring the range was “among the tasks 
[they] were paid to perform.”37  In Gorum v. Sessoms, we held 
that a tenured university professor was speaking pursuant to his 
official duties when he served as a student’s advisor at a 
disciplinary hearing and when he withdrew the university 
president’s invitation to speak at a fraternity prayer breakfast, 
since “[i]t was through his position as a professor and 
department chair” that he was able to counsel the student, and 
since the professor chaired the fraternity’s speakers 
committee.38  And in De Ritis v. McGarrigle, we held that a 
public defender was speaking pursuant to his official duties 
when he made in-court comments to the effect that his transfer 
to a different office unit was “punish[ment] for taking too many 
cases to trial,” since he had “in-court obligations to build 
rapport with the Court,” which could be accomplished through 
such off-the record “idle chatter,” and since “the mode and 
                                                 
36  Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424. 
37  Foraker v. Chaffinch, 501 F.3d 231, 233-34, 241-43 
(3d Cir. 2007), abrogated on other grounds by 
Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379 (2011). 
38  Gorum v. Sessoms, 561 F.3d 179, 186 (3d Cir. 2009). 
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manner of his speech were possible only as an ordinary 
corollary to his position as a government employee.”39 
On the other hand, in Dougherty v. School District of 
Philadelphia, we held that a school district employee was not 
speaking pursuant to his official duties—and was instead 
speaking as a citizen—when he disclosed alleged misconduct 
by the school superintendent to a local newspaper.40  And in 
Flora v. County of Luzerne, we held that a public defender 
sufficiently alleged that he was speaking as a citizen when he 
initiated a class action lawsuit on behalf of indigent criminal 
defendants and reported his county’s noncompliance with a 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court order to the Special Master 
whose report had given rise to that order.41 
2. 
Here, Ms. Bradley claims that she was speaking as a 
citizen when she raised her budget concerns at the EMC 
meeting on October 29, 2014.42  Unfortunately for her cause, 
                                                 
39  De Ritis v. McGarrigle, 861 F.3d 444, 449, 453-54 (3d 
Cir. 2017) (quoting affidavit and complaint). 
40  Dougherty v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 772 F.3d 979, 
983, 988 (3d Cir. 2014). 
41  Flora v. Cty. of Luzerne, 776 F.3d 169, 173, 179-80 (3d 
Cir. 2015). 
42  In the District Court, Ms. Bradley also argued that she 
was speaking as a citizen during the ABC meetings of 
September 20 and 27, 2012.  At oral argument before 
this Court, however, Ms. Bradley’s counsel abandoned 
that argument.  Oral Argument at 1:56-2:40, Bradley v. 
W. Chester Univ., No. 17-1588 (3d Cir. Nov. 8, 2017), 
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this case falls squarely within the framework of Garcetti, 
Foraker, Gorum, and De Ritis—i.e., her speech at that meeting 
was made pursuant to her official duties, and was therefore not 
protected by the First Amendment.  Ms. Bradley’s job 
description indicated that she was expected to “[r]eview and 
recommend, as requested, changes to the University[’]s budget 
allocation processes,”43 and she agreed that her position, in 
practice, included those responsibilities.44  She attended the 
EMC meeting at the behest of Mr. Mixner, her direct 
supervisor, and the record contains no indication that the 
meeting was open to the public.  She recommended her 
alternate budget—the one she felt “presents reality”—directly 
in response to a question from one of the EMC’s members.  In 
other words, she spoke “because that is part of what [s]he . . . 
was employed to do,”45 in a “mode and manner [that] were 
possible only as an ordinary corollary to h[er] position.”46 
                                                 
http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/oralargument/audio/17-
1588Bradleyv.WestChesterUniv.mp3. 
43  App. 78. 
44  Formal job descriptions may factor into the analysis of 
a plaintiff’s official duties, but because they “often bear 
little resemblance to the duties an employee actually is 
expected to perform . . . the listing of a given task in an 
employee’s written job description is neither necessary 
nor sufficient to demonstrate that conducting the task 
is within the scope of the employee’s professional 
duties for First Amendment purposes.”  Garcetti v. 
Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424-25 (2006). 
45  Id. at 421. 
46  De Ritis, 861 F.3d at 454. 
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To support her argument that she was speaking as a 
citizen, Ms. Bradley points to the fact that Mr. Mixner, in his 
deposition, indicated that it was not part of Ms. Bradley’s 
“ordinary duties” to either “investigate misrepresentations of 
financial information” or to “report willful misrepresentations 
of financial information.”47  The District Court may have had 
this testimony in mind when it noted that “[t]here is a 
difference between recommending changes to improve or 
streamline an existing policy and upending the policy with 
accusations that it is in itself fraudulent.”48  The undisputed 
facts, however, show that Ms. Bradley was paid to critically 
evaluate WCU’s budgeting process—i.e., scrutinizing and 
analyzing the numbers appearing in the budget was part of her 
job.  That is what she was doing at the EMC meeting on 
October 29, 2014, and that is why we hold that she was 
speaking pursuant to her official duties as a public employee at 
that meeting, and not as a citizen. 
Ms. Bradley also points to portions of Mr. Mixner’s 
deposition testimony where he indicated that it was not part of 
Ms. Bradley’s “ordinary duties” to “report to senior leaders of 
[WCU] outside her chain of command.”49  Some courts have 
predicted that bypassing a government bureaucracy’s normal 
pecking order would be outside a public employee’s ordinary 
                                                 
47  App. 519. 
48  App. 776. 
49  App. 519. 
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job responsibilities.50  This Court, however, has not done so,51 
and need not do so in this case.  The undisputed evidence 
shows that Ms. Bradley was not speaking “outside her chain of 
command” when she was reporting to the EMC on October 29, 
2014; rather, she was responding, in her official capacity, to a 
direct question by a member of that committee. 
3. 
 We have repeatedly noted that “[s]peech involving 
government impropriety occupies the highest rung of First 
Amendment protection,”52 and we take seriously Ms. 
Bradley’s concerns about WCU’s budgeting practices.  
Nevertheless, we are mindful of the Supreme Court’s 
admonition that “while the First Amendment invests public 
                                                 
50  See, e.g., Dahlia v. Rodriguez, 735 F.3d 1060, 1074 
(9th Cir. 2013) (“When a public employee 
communicates with individuals or entities outside of 
his chain of command, it is unlikely that he is speaking 
pursuant to his duties.”). 
51  Cf. Foraker v. Chaffinch, 501 F.3d 231, 240-41, 243 
(3d Cir. 2007) (holding that plaintiffs “were acting 
within their job duties when they expressed their 
concerns up the chain of command” and to the State 
Auditor). 
52  McGreevy v. Stroup, 413 F.3d 359, 365 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(citing Swineford v. Snyder Cty., 15 F.3d 1258, 1274 
(3d Cir. 1994)); see also Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 
2369, 2380 (2014) (“corruption in a public program 
and misuse of state funds . . . obviously involves a 
matter of significant public concern”). 
 19 
 
employees with certain rights, it does not empower them to 
constitutionalize the employee grievance.”53  Because Ms. 
Bradley’s speech was made as a government employee and not 
a citizen, she has failed to state a First Amendment claim.54  
Therefore, we uphold the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Mr. Mixner on Count I of her Amended 
Complaint. 
D. 
 We turn next to the District Court’s determination that 
PASSHE and WCU are entitled to Eleventh Amendment 
immunity.   
In order to protect States’ “solvency and dignity,”55 the 
Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution has 
been interpreted by the Supreme Court to shield States and 
certain State-affiliated entities from suits for damages in 
federal court.56  Because of the “sweeping immunity from suit” 
this Amendment provides, and in order to “ensure that [the 
                                                 
53  Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 420 (2006) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
54  Because we conclude that there was no First 
Amendment violation, we need not reach the qualified 
immunity issue.  Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 
232, 236 (2009). 
55  Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 
53 (1994). 
56  See, e.g., Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890); 
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 
(1996); Maliandi v. Montclair State Univ., 845 F.3d 77, 
83 (3d Cir. 2016). 
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Amendment’s] reach does not extend beyond proper bounds,” 
this Court has developed a “fact-intensive, three-step balancing 
test to ascertain whether a [S]tate-affiliated entity is an ‘arm of 
the State’ that falls within the ambit of [that] Amendment.”57 
Here, the District Court, relying on our 1987 decision in 
Skehan v. State System of Higher Education (“Skehan II”),58 
held that PASSHE and WCU were entitled to Eleventh 
Amendment immunity and dismissed Ms. Bradley’s § 1983 
claim against those defendants.  In this Court, Ms. Bradley 
points to our 2008 decision in Cooper v. Southeastern 
Pennsylvania Transportation Authority,59 where we noted that 
“the Supreme Court has refined its Eleventh Amendment 
jurisprudence” since the early 1990s, and that we therefore 
“have modified our own jurisprudence to reflect direction” 
from that Court.60  Correspondingly, she invites us to perform 
a “fresh analysis” of PASSHE and WCU’s status under the 
Eleventh Amendment.61 
We accept Ms. Bradley’s invitation,62 but come to the 
same conclusion we reached 30 years ago in Skehan II.  Under 
our current jurisprudence, and under the current legal and 
                                                 
57  Maliandi, 845 F.3d at 83. 
58  815 F.2d 244 (3d Cir. 1987). 
59  548 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 2008). 
60  Id. at 299. 
61  Appellant’s Brief at 27 (citing Maliandi, 845 F.3d at 
84). 
62   See Karns v. Shanahan, Nos. 16-2171, 16-2172, slip 
op. at 11-14 (3d Cir. Jan. 11, 2018) (reexamining the 
Fitchik factors as applied to the New Jersey Transit 
Corporation). 
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practical realities of those institutions, both PASSHE and 
WCU are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity and are 
thus not subject to suits for damages in federal court.  We 
therefore uphold the District Court’s dismissal of the § 1983 
claim against those institutions. 
1. 
 As noted supra, this Court considers three factors when 
determining if a State-affiliated entity is an “arm of the State” 
entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.63  Known as the 
“Fitchik factors,”64 they are: (1) whether the money that would 
pay any judgment would come from the state; (2) the status of 
the agency under state law; and (3) the degree of autonomy 
possessed by the agency.65  At one point, our jurisprudence 
gave the first factor—the “funding factor”—more “weight” 
than the other factors.66  In light of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Regents of the University of California v. Doe,67 
however, we “recalibrated” the factors’ weight, and “now treat 
                                                 
63  Maliandi, 845 F.3d at 83. 
64  See Fitchik v. N.J. Rail Operations, Inc., 873 F.2d 655 
(3d Cir. 1989) (en banc) (consolidating the earlier, 
nine-factor test of Urbano v. Bd. of Managers, 415 F.2d 
247 (3d Cir. 1969)). 
65  Cooper, 548 F.3d at 299 n.4. 
66  Maliandi, 845 F.3d at 84. 
67  519 U.S. 425, 431 (1997) (noting that an Eleventh 
Amendment analysis should not be “convert[ed] . . . 
into a formalistic question of ultimate financial 
liability”). 
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all three Fitchik factors as co-equals, with the funding factor 
breaking the tie in a close case.”68   
 The defendants concede that the funding factor weighs 
in Ms. Bradley’s favor since Pennsylvania law shields the 
Commonwealth’s treasury from PASSHE and WCU’s 
liabilities69 and since both institutions have revenue sources 
other than state appropriations from which to satisfy adverse 
judgments.  Additionally, Ms. Bradley notes—and the 
defendants agree—that both PASSHE and WCU receive a far 
smaller amount of their budget from the Commonwealth than 
they did at the time Skehan II was decided.  Although she 
argues that that fact strengthens the force with which the 
funding factor weighs in her favor, our “recalibration” of the 
balance among the Fitchik factors perhaps negates the effect of 
that budgetary change.  Be that as it may, this factor weighs 
                                                 
68  Maliandi, 845 F.3d at 84 (citing Benn v. First Judicial 
Dist. of Pa., 426 F.3d 233, 239-40 (3d Cir. 2005)); see 
also Karns v. Shanahan, Nos. 16-2171, 16-2172, slip 
op. at 11 (3d Cir. Jan. 11, 2018) (“[E]ach case must be 
considered on its own terms, with courts determining 
and then weighing the qualitative strength of each 
individual [Fitchik] factor in the unique factual 
circumstances at issue.”). 
69  See 24 P.S. § 20-2003-A(b)(3) (“[T]he system shall 
have no power at any time or in any manner, to pledge 
the credit or taxing power of the Commonwealth, nor 
shall any of its obligations or debts be deemed to be 
obligations of the Commonwealth, nor shall the 
Commonwealth be liable for the payment of principal 
or interest on such obligations.”). 
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decidedly against granting Eleventh Amendment immunity to 
PASSHE and its universities. 
2. 
 The second Fitchik factor—status under state law—
“requires that we focus on whether the State itself considers the 
entity [under consideration] an arm of the [S]tate.”70  Under 
this factor, we consider “how state law treats the agency 
generally” by looking to “(1) explicit statutory indications 
about how an entity should be regarded; (2) case law from the 
state courts—especially the state supreme court—regarding an 
entity’s immunity or status as an arm of the State; and (3) 
whether the entity is subject to laws for which the State itself 
has waived its own immunity (such as state tort claims acts).”71  
We also consider “whether the entity is separately 
incorporated, whether the agency can sue or be sued in its own 
right, . . . whether it is immune from state taxation[,]” whether 
it can “exercise the power of eminent domain,” whether it is 
subject to “state administrative procedure and civil service 
laws,” whether it can “enter contracts and make purchases on 
its own behalf, and whether the entity owns real estate.”72  
Although we have acknowledged that our analysis of this 
factor is “multifaceted” and can become “hopelessly 
checkered,”73 we believe that Pennsylvania law consistently 
treats PASSHE and its universities as arms of the state, and that 
                                                 
70  Bowers v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 475 F.3d 
524, 548 (3d Cir. 2007). 
71  Maliandi, 845 F.3d at 91. 
72  Id. 
73  Id. 
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this factor, therefore, weighs in favor of granting Eleventh 
Amendment immunity to those institutions. 
 Act 188,74 which created PASSHE in 1982, indicates 
that PASSHE is “part of the Commonwealth’s system of higher 
education,” 75 even though the act made PASSHE independent 
of the Pennsylvania Department of Education.76  Act 188 also 
indicates that Commonwealth appropriations to PASSHE and 
its universities are “ordinary expenses of government, 
requiring only a majority vote of each House of the General 
Assembly”;77 under the Pennsylvania Constitution, on the 
other hand, appropriations to schools “not under the absolute 
control of the Commonwealth” require a “vote of two-thirds of 
all the members elected to each House.”78 
 Pennsylvania courts have determined that PASSHE and 
its universities are “Commonwealth agencies,” and therefore 
part of the “Commonwealth government,” for purposes of the 
Pennsylvania Judicial Code79 and Administrative Agency 
                                                 
74  24 P.S. § 20-2001-A et seq. 
75  24 P.S. § 20-2003-A(a) (emphasis added). 
76  24 P.S. § 20-2002-A(a). 
77  24 P.S. § 20-2002-A(b). 
78  Pa. Const. art. III § 30 (emphasis added). 
79  See, e.g., E. Stroudsburg Univ. v. Hubbard, 591 A.2d 
1181, 1184 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991).  This 
determination gives the Pennsylvania Commonwealth 
Court—as opposed to a Court of Common Pleas—
original jurisdiction over civil actions filed against 
PASSHE and its universities.  Id.; see also 42 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. §§ 102, 761(a). 
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Law.80  Municipalities and local government agencies—on 
which the Supreme Court has “consistently refused” to confer 
Eleventh Amendment immunity81—are, on the other hand, not 
considered part of the “Commonwealth government” under 
either statutory scheme.82 
 Pennsylvania courts have also found that PASSHE and 
its universities are “Commonwealth parties” under the 
Pennsylvania Sovereign Immunity Act,83 which entitles them 
to share the Commonwealth’s sovereign immunity except 
                                                 
80  See, e.g., Fisler v. State Sys. of Higher Educ., 78 A.3d 
30 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2013).  The Administrative 
Agency Law specifically exempts “[p]roceedings 
before [PASSHE] involving student discipline” from 
its coverage.  2 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 501(b)(4). 
81  Lake Country Estate, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning 
Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 401 (1979). 
82  42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §102 (excluding “any political 
subdivision, municipal or other local authority, or any 
officer or agency of any such political subdivision or 
local authority” from the definition of “Commonwealth 
government” in the Judicial Code); 2 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 
101 (same, for purposes of the Administrative Agency 
Law). 
83  42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 8521-28; see, e.g., Armenti v. 
Pennsylvania State Sys. of Higher Educ., 100 A.3d 
772, 777 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2014); Poliskiewicz v. E. 
Stroudsburg Univ., 536 A.2d 472, 474 (Pa. Commw. 
Ct. 1988). 
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where waived for certain claims in state courts.84  
Municipalities and local government agencies do not share that 
sovereign immunity; instead, they have limited “governmental 
immunity” under the Pennsylvania Subdivision Tort Claims 
Act.85   
PASSHE and its universities are also subject to state 
administrative procedure laws.  Under the Pennsylvania 
Commonwealth Documents Law, for example, their proposed 
regulations must go through a notice and comment process.86  
Under the Regulatory Review Act, those regulations must be 
submitted, along with a thorough analysis, to the Independent 
Regulatory Review Commission.87  And under the 
                                                 
84  42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8522; see also 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 
8528(a) (limiting damages which may be recovered 
from “Commonwealth parties” in claims where those 
parties’ sovereign immunity has been waived).  
85  42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8541-64; see Bowers v. Nat’l 
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 475 F.3d 524, 548 (3d Cir. 
2007) (noting that a similar distinction between the 
immunity granted to University of Iowa and the 
immunity granted to political subdivisions in Iowa 
weighed in favor of finding that the university was 
considered an arm of the State); cf. Maliandi v. 
Montclair State Univ., 845 F.3d 77, 93 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(noting that Montclair State University was covered by 
the same Tort Claims Act as New Jersey municipalities 
and counties, “undercutting the inference that entities 
subject to this Act are otherwise immune from suit”). 
86  45 P.S. §§ 1201-02. 
87  71 P.S. § 745.5. 
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Commonwealth Attorneys Act, the regulations must be 
submitted to both the state Attorney General and the 
Governor’s General Counsel, where they are reviewed “for 
form and legality.”88 
PASSHE is separately incorporated,89 which weighs 
against a finding that it is an arm of the State.  There is also no 
apparent indication that PASSHE or its universities can 
exercise the power of eminent domain or that they are subject 
to civil service laws.  Other considerations cut both ways:  It 
appears, for example, that PASSHE and its universities can sue 
and be sued in their own right, although they may be 
represented in litigation by either the Pennsylvania Attorney 
General (as was done in this case) or by the Governor’s 
General Counsel.90  It also appears that real property owned by 
PASSHE and its universities is generally immune from state 
taxation,91 although it may be subject to local taxation when it 
                                                 
88  71 P.S. §§ 732-204(b), 732-301(10). 
89  24 P.S. § 20-2003-A(b)(1) (granting PASSHE the 
“right and power[ t]o have perpetual existence as a 
corporation”). 
90  71 P.S. § 732-204(c); cf. Bowers, 475 F.3d at 548 
(noting, before finding that the University of Iowa is 
considered an arm of the State of Iowa, that “although 
the University may bring suit in its own name, it may 
do so only through the State Attorney General’s Office, 
which also is obligated to defend the University from 
suit”). 
91  Cf. Pa. State Univ. v. Derry Twp. Sch. Dist., 731 A.2d 
1272, 1275 (Pa. 1999) (suggesting that PASSHE 
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is not used consistently with its governmental purpose.92 And 
although PASSHE and its universities have the power to enter 
into contracts and make purchases on their own behalf, and can 
acquire and own their own real estate, those powers are 
constrained in several ways, which are discussed infra. 
The balance of considerations under this “status under 
state law” factor weighs in favor of finding that Pennsylvania 
treats PASSHE and its universities as arms of the state.  
Statutory and case law consistently treats these institutions as 
it treats the state government itself, and contrary considerations 
(e.g., separate incorporation, ability to sue in their own name) 
arguably deal more with form than with function.  This factor, 
then, weighs strongly in favor of Eleventh Amendment 
immunity. 
                                                 
universities’ real property is exempt from real estate 
taxes). 
92  See, e.g., Ind. Univ. of Pa. v. Ind. Cty. Bd. of 
Assessment Appeals, 2015 WL 5671153, at *1, *8 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 2015) (unpublished decision) (affirming 
order overruling PASSHE university’s appeal of 
determination that a portion of its real property, which 
it had leased “for a private or commercial purpose,” 
was taxable); Pa. State Sys. of Higher Educ. v. Ind. 
Area Sch. Dist., 2012 WL 8667893, at *1, *6-8 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 2012) (unpublished decision) 
(presumption of immunity from taxation was overcome 
to the extent that PASSHE university leased property 
for rental income rather than using it for educational 
purposes). 
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3. 
 The third Fitchik factor—the autonomy factor—focuses 
on “the entity’s governing structure and the oversight and 
control exerted by a State’s governor and legislature.”93  Our 
analysis of this factor leads us to conclude, as we did in Skehan 
II, that PASSHE and its universities are “not autonomous but 
subject to substantial state supervision and control,”94 and that, 
therefore, this factor weighs in favor of Eleventh Amendment 
immunity. 
a. 
The governing structure of PASSHE and its universities 
places significant constraints on those institutions’ autonomy.  
PASSHE is governed by, and its powers are exercised through, 
a Board of Governors (“BOG”).95  The BOG consists of twenty 
members:  the Governor, the State Secretary of Education, four 
members of the General Assembly, and fourteen members 
appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the 
State Senate.96  Of these Governor-appointed members, three 
must be PASSHE university students.  The Governor and 
Secretary of Education serve on the BOG as long as they 
remain in office; the General Assembly members’ terms 
coincide with their elective terms; the student members serve 
until graduation; and the other appointed members serve four-
                                                 
93  Maliandi v. Montclair State Univ., 845 F.3d 77, 96 (3d 
Cir. 2016). 
94  Skehan v. State Sys. of Higher Educ., 815 F.2d 244, 248 
(3d Cir. 1987). 
95  24 P.S. § 20-2004-A(a). 
96  Id. 
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year terms.97  The BOG employs, as “chief executive officer” 
of PASSHE, a Chancellor who serves “at the [BOG]’s 
pleasure.”98 
 PASSHE universities themselves are each headed by a 
separate Council of Trustees (“COT”).99  Each COT consists 
of eleven members, one of whom must be a full-time 
undergraduate student.100  Each COT member is appointed by 
the Governor, and all except for the student member require 
State Senate confirmation.101  The student member serves for a 
maximum of four years; the other members serve six-year 
terms.102  The BOG appoints, as “chief executive officer” of 
each PASSHE university, a president who, like the Chancellor, 
serves “at the [BOG]’s pleasure.”103 
In Bowers v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, we 
held that the University of Iowa was entitled to Eleventh 
Amendment immunity after noting that all members of its 
Board of Regents were appointed by the Governor.104  We 
came to the same conclusion in Maliandi v. Montclair State 
University after similarly noting that all members of 
                                                 
97  Id. 
98  24 P.S. §§ 20-2005-A, 20-2006-A(a)(1). 
99  24 P.S. § 20-2008-A. 
100  24 P.S. § 20-2008-A(b). 
101  24 P.S. § 20-2008-A(a),(b). 
102 24 P.S. § 20-2008-A(b). 
103  24 P.S. §§ 20-2006-A(a), 20-2010-A. 
104  Bowers v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 475 F.3d 
524, 548-49 (3d Cir. 2007). 
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Montclair’s Board of Trustees were Governor-appointed.105  
We came to the opposite conclusion in Kovats v. Rutgers, 
denying Eleventh Amendment immunity to Rutgers after 
noting that only a “bare minimum” of its Board of Governors, 
and less than half of its Board of Trustees, were Governor-
appointed.106   
Here, all members of the BOG and the COTs are 
Governor-appointed.  It is true that, in Bowers and Maliandi, 
we noted that Board members were removable by their 
respective Governors “for cause,”107 and that there is no similar 
provision in Act 188 vis-à-vis members of PASSHE’s BOG or 
its universities’ COTs.  It appears, however, that such members 
may be removed by the Governor at will,108 reducing those 
                                                 
105  Maliandi v. Montclair State Univ., 845 F.3d 77, 98 (3d 
Cir. 2016). 
106  Kovats v. Rutgers, 822 F.2d 1303, 1311-12 (3d Cir. 
1987). 
107  Bowers, 475 F.3d at 549; Maliandi, 845 F.3d at 97-98. 
108  See Pa. Const. art. VI § 7 (“Appointed civil officers, 
other than judges of the courts of record, may be 
removed at the pleasure of the power by which they 
shall have been appointed.”); Naef v. City of Allentown, 
227 A.2d 888, 889 (Pa. 1967) (“In a multitude of 
decisions, this Court has ruled that, under the above 
constitutional provision, appointed public officers are 
removable from office at the pleasure of the appointive 
power even though the appointments were made for a 
statutorily fixed term.”).  The General Assembly may 
limit this constitutional removal power expressly, and 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has inferred limits on 
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bodies’ autonomy further than if they were removable only for 
cause.   
b. 
 There are also statutory barriers around PASSHE and 
its universities’ autonomy.  Both the BOG and COT have 
numerous powers and duties under Act 188, but many of them 
are limited.109  For example, as mentioned supra, although 
PASSHE may acquire real property, it must obtain the General 
Assembly’s approval before disposing of that real property.110  
It may enter into collective bargaining agreements with its 
employees, but must “make a coalition bargaining arrangement 
with the Commonwealth” when it negotiates with 
noninstructional employees.111  It may enter into contracts for 
construction, repair, renovation, and maintenance, but when 
these contracts exceed a threshold amount ($18,500), it must 
utilize competitive bidding.112   
                                                 
this power in several cases where officers are appointed 
to staggered terms.  See, e.g., Bowers v. Pa. Labor 
Relations Bd., 167 A.2d 480, 485 (Pa. 1961); Watson 
v. Pa. Tpk. Comm’n, 125 A.2d 354, 358 (Pa. 1956).  
Act 188, however, does not create staggered terms for 
members of the BOG or the COTs; we cannot, 
therefore, infer a limit on the Governor’s power to 
remove those members. 
109 See 24 P.S. §§ 20-2006-A, 20-2010-A. 
110  24 P.S. §§ 20-2003-A(b)(3), 20-2018-A. 
111  24 P.S. § 20-2003-A(c). 
112  24 P.S. § 20-2003-A.1. 
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 Additionally, PASSHE and its universities are, like 
Montclair, “subject to significant reporting requirements and 
rules for internal governance.”113  For example, all activities of 
these institutions are subject to audit by the Commonwealth’s 
Auditor General, and PASSHE must submit annual reports to 
the General Assembly.114  Each PASSHE university must 
submit a thorough annual report to the Department of 
Education and the Joint State Government Commission, which 
report “shall include data for all programs of the institution.”115  
And, as noted supra, PASSHE and its universities are subject 
to a host of state administrative procedure laws. 
Unlike in Kovats, where “state intervention . . . is 
minimal,”116 there are many “indicia of state control”117 over 
PASSHE and its universities, as there were in Bowers and 
Maliandi.  Combined with the significantly constrained 
governing structure, these considerations lead us to conclude 
that PASSHE and its universities maintain only limited 
autonomy from the state.  This factor, then, also weighs 
strongly in favor of Eleventh Amendment immunity. 
                                                 
113  See Maliandi v. Montclair State Univ., 845 F.3d 77, 98 
(3d Cir. 2016). 
114  24 P.S. § 20-2015-A(a). 
115  24 P.S. § 20-2017-A(a). 
116  Kovats v. Rutgers, 822 F.2d 1303, 1311 (3d Cir. 1987); 
see also id. at 1311-12 (noting that Rutgers is “not 
subject to the operational constraints placed on most 
other state agencies,” such as the need to “comply with 
civil service, competitive bidding[,] or administrative 
procedure requirements”). 
117 Maliandi, 845 F.3d at 99. 
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4. 
 We have concluded that two of the three Fitchik factors 
tip strongly towards PASSHE and its universities, including 
WCU, while one factor weighs against them.  After 
“[w]eighing and balancing the qualitative strength of each 
factor in the context of the circumstances presented,”118 we 
hold that those institutions are entitled to Eleventh Amendment 
immunity from Ms. Bradley’s claims in federal court.  As we 
noted in Maliandi, this conclusion may result in “limited and 
unsatisfying avenues to obtain relief” for litigants like Ms. 
Bradley.119  Nevertheless, “comity and state sovereignty are 
constitutional precepts and lynchpins of our federalist system 
of government,”120 and we must, therefore, uphold the District 
Court’s dismissal of Ms. Bradley’s § 1983 claims against these 
institutions. 
III. 
Because we find that Ms. Bradley was not speaking as 
a citizen at the October 29, 2014 EMC meeting, she has no 
First Amendment claim; therefore, we will affirm the District 
Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Mr. Mixner.  
And because we find that PASSHE and WCU are entitled to 
Eleventh Amendment immunity, we will affirm the District 
Court’s dismissal of Count I against those defendants. 
                                                 
118 Karns v. Shanahan, Nos. 16-2171, 16-2172, slip op. at 
21 (3d Cir. Jan. 11, 2018). 
119  Id. 
120  Id. 
